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So is it with freedom of speech. The Confederation Act recites the desire 
of the three provinces to be federally united into one Dominion “with a 
constitution similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom.” Under that 
constitution, government is by parliamentary institutions, including popular 
assemblies elected by the people at large in both provinces and Dominion; 
government resting ultimately on public opinion reached by discussion and 
the interplay of ideas. If that discussion is placed under license, its basic 
condition is destroyed; the government, as licensor, becomes disjoined from 
the citizenry. The only security is steadily advancing enlightenment, for 
which the widest range of controversy is the sine qua non.
Justice Rand in Saumur v. City o f Quebec}
INTRODUCTION
Justice Ivan Cleveland Rand died in 1969, the year before I arrived in Canada from 
New Zealand as a graduate student. While his voice was influential among those who 
persuaded me to come to this country to undertake further studies, Justice Rand did 
not speak to me in person but rather through the power of his judgments. In particular, 
his seminal judgment in Roncarelli v. Duplessis2 (“Roncarelir) struck a particularly 
harmonious chord at a time when I was concerned about the absence from New 
Zealand case law of any developed theory or conception of the role of the courts when 
faced by the spectre of abuse of executive powers. If Canada had judges as articulate 
and reflective as this, it was obviously a place in which graduate legal studies could be 
a stimulating experience.
* Emeritus Professor of Law, Queen’s University. This is the revised text of the 2002 Ivan C. 
Rand Memorial Lecture, delivered to the Faculty o f Law, University o f New Brunswick.
1 [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299, at 330.
2 [1959] S.C.R. 121.
Within a few short weeks of my arrival in the Fall of 1970, the invocation 
of the War Measures Act3 certainly led to second thoughts about whether I had 
made the right choice, at least in terms of a jurisdiction where placing constraints 
on unbridled executive power was a major priority. Indeed, the more I looked into 
Canadian jurisprudence on the subject, the more I learned that there was no judicial 
consensus as to the appropriate role of the courts in relation to exercises of executive 
power.4 However, Justice Rand seldom if ever disappointed, especially as I read more 
of his judgments in the public law arena and, in particular, the other constitutional 
and administrative law cases5 coming to the Supreme Court of Canada from Quebec 
during the Duplessis era.
At a time when there again is much interest in, indeed controversy about, 
the extent to which underlying and unwritten principles have a role to play in our 
constitutional law, it is timely to re-examine Justice Rand’s position on the implicit 
premises of the Canadian constitution and the extent to which they impose constraints 
on both executive and legislative powers, both federal and provincial.6
THE “IMPLIED BILL OF RIGHTS”
While Justice Rand never apparently used the term, the theory of underlying or 
“unwritten” principles of the constitution with which he is associated is that of “an 
implied Bill of Rights”, said by many to find its justification in the Preamble to what 
is now the Constitution Act, 1867. One, and perhaps the dominant or most ambitious 
conception of this theory, is the following: given the expressed desire of the founding 
provinces to have “a constitution similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom”, 
there were certain underlying principles incorporated into the Canadian constitution. 
These principles were inviolable in the sense that neither the provincial legislatures 
nor the Parliament of Canada could remove them.
3 R.S.C. 1970 c. W-2.
4 I have explored this theme in “The Role o f the Judiciary in the Review of Administrative 
Policy Decisions: Issues o f Legality” in M. J. Mossman and G. Otis (eds.), The Judiciary as 
Third Branch o f Government: Manifestations and Challenges to Legitimacy (Montréal: Les 
Éditions Thémis, 2000) at 313.
5 I have previously dealt with the administrative law judgments o f Justice Rand in a symposium 
in his memory at the University o f Western Ontario:“Mr. Justice Rand: Defining the Limits 
of Court Control o f the Administrative and Executive Process” (1979-80) 18 University o f  
Western Ontario Law Review 65. In that symposium, his contributions to constitutional law 
were assessed by my late and distinguished colleague, Dr. W. R. Lederman: “Mr. Justice 
Rand and Canada’s Federal Constitution” (1979-80) 18 U. W.O. L. Rev. 31.
6 This theme has been explored by A. Lajoie, “The Implied Bill o f Rights, the Charter and the 
Role of the Judiciary” (1995) 44 University o f New Brunswick Law Journal 337.
The theory first surfaced in the judgments of Chief Justice Duff and Justice 
Cannon in Re The Accurate News and Information Act o f  Alberta1 (“Alberta Press”) 
in 1938 in reference to provincial legislation compelling Alberta newspapers to print 
government news releases as to the objectives of legislation and the difficulties of 
achieving those objectives. It was then invoked by some of the judges in two cases 
coming out of Quebec in the 1950s, notably Switzman v. Elbling8 (“Switzmarf’) and 
Saumur v. City o f Quebec9 (“Saumur'’), both involving attempts by the Duplessis 
government to suppress the practice of their faith by Jehovah’s Witnesses.
Leaving aside for the moment the merits of the argument for such an implied 
Bill of Rights, it is important to record once again the limited nature of its acceptance 
in these three cases. First, in none of the three judgments or elsewhere (at least at that 
time) did it attract the support of a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada, even 
as a constraint on provincial legislative activity. Thus, only three10 of the six justices 
based their judgments on that theory in the Alberta Press case, with the other three11 
expressly declining to pronounce on this question. Similarly, it was not possible to 
construct a majority in either Switzman or Saumur accepting its legitimacy as part of 
Canada’s constitutional order. Secondly, of the justices who accepted the validity of 
the theory, only one, Justice Abbott in Switzman, was prepared to go as far, in what 
even he described as dicta, as to see it as a limitation on the legislative jurisdiction of 
Parliament.12 Even Justice Rand located his discussion of the theory clearly within 
the domain of challenges to provincial legislative action.13 However, in Switzman, 
he made clear that he was not foreclosing the possibility that the principles might be 
deployed against federal legislation -  a matter that “must await future consideration”.14 
Thirdly, the scope of the protections derived from the implied Bill of Rights appeared 
to have been limited in the sense that, in all three cases, the focal points were those 
of freedom of speech, political expression and the press, freedoms that the relevant 
justices saw as essential for the maintenance of parliamentary institutions.15 Fourthly, 
while there were frequent references to the Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867, 
the elaboration of the theory was more broadly-based. This was particularly clear from 
the judgment of Justice Rand in Switzman, where he described the argument as derived 
not just from the Preamble but the overall structure of the Constitution Act, 1867:
7 [1938] S.C.R. 100, at 133-34 and 145-46.
8 [1957] S.C.R. 285, at 306
9 Supra note 1.
10 Justice Davis concurred with Chief Justice Duff.
11 Supra note 7, Kerwin J. (Crocket J., concurring) at 162 and Hudson J. at 163.
12 Supra note 8, at 328.
13 Supra note 1, at 328-33 (Saumur) and supra note 8, at 306-07 (Switzman).
14 Supra note 8, at 307.
15 See also Rand J.’s judgment in Boucher v. The King, [1951] S.C.R. 265 at 285, 288 and 290. 
However, both here and in Saumur, he also attributed a fundamental status to freedom of 
religion: ibid., at 285 and Saumur, supra note 1, at 329-30.
Indicated by the opening words o f the preamble in the Act o f 1867, 
reciting the desire o f the four Provinces to be united in a federal union 
with a constitution “similar in principle to that o f the United Kingdom”, 
the political theory which the Act embodies is that o f parliamentary 
government, with all its social implications, and the provisions o f the statute 
elaborate that principle in the institutional apparatus which they create or 
contemplate.16
In other words, the foundation on which at least this version of the theory is 
built is not only the Preamble but also, as Dale Gibson has argued,17 those parts of the 
Constitution Act, 1867 which deal with the legislative branch and constitutionalise 
the “Parliament of Canada” and the legislative assemblies of the provinces. It did not 
involve the Preamble as an independent, free-standing source of implicit constitutional 
rights or protections.
Judicial support was therefore equivocal at best and the seeming ambit of 
the doctrine’s operation limited. Indeed, any lingering weight that the theory had in 
Canadian constitutional law seemed to suffer a mortal blow from the Supreme Court 
of Canada in Canada (Attorney General) v. Montreal (City)ls (“Dupond’), where the 
implied Bill of Rights was advanced as a basis for striking down a Montreal by-law 
regulating assembly as contrary to freedoms of “speech, of assembly and association, 
of the press and of religion”. However, according to Justice Beetz, for the majority:
None of the freedoms referred to is so enshrined in the Constitution as to be 
above the reach of competent legislation.19
This appeared to be the death-knell once and for all of the implied Bill of 
Rights theory!
Nonetheless, the Court and indeed Justice Beetz himself had second thoughts. 
In a 1995 article, Andrée Lajoie reported a private conversation with Justice Beetz in 
which he stated that, in the course of writing the judgment in Dupond, he felt himself 
becoming a conservative but not being able to help it!20 Obviously, he must have 
reconsidered because in 1985 he concurred with Chief Justice Dickson in Fraser v. 
Public Service Staff Relations Board11 in which the then Chief Justice gave new
16 Supra note 8, at 306.
17 D. Gibson, “Constitutional Vibes: Reflections on the Secession Reference and the Unwritten 
Constitution” (1999-2000) 11 National Journal o f  Constitutional Law 49, at 51-52.
18 [1978] 2 S.C.R. 770.
19 Ibid., at 796.
20 Supra note 6, at 342, note 32.
21 [1985] 2 S.C.R. 455.
credence to the implied Bill of Rights theory.22 Even more significantly and without 
any reference to what he had said in Dupond, Justice Beetz’s concurring judgment 
in OPSEU v. Ontario23 went so far as to extol the version of the theory presented by 
Justice Abbott in Switzman:
There is no doubt in my mind that the basic structure of our Constitution, 
as established by the Constitution Act, 1867, contemplates the existence of 
certain political institutions, including freely elected legislative bodies at 
the federal and provincial levels.24
After references to both the Alberta Press case25 and Justice Abbott’s reasons 
for decision in Switzman,26 he then continued:
Speaking more generally, I hold that neither Parliament nor the provincial 
legislatures may enact legislation the effect of which would be to substantially 
interfere with the operation o f this basic constitutional structure.27
However, as Justice Beetz himself observed in the very next paragraph, to 
the extent the Charter gave even broader protections to political rights than could be 
comprehended within the scope of the basic structure of the Constitution Act, 1867, it 
was unlikely that such future claims would arise all that frequently!28
Indeed, this became even clearer when one considers the impact of the 
constitutional changes of 1982. There now seem to be very limited opportunities for 
invocation of an implied Bill of Rights argument, at least of a democratic, parliamentary 
institution-enhancing variety. It now takes a constitutional amendment to alter 
provisions of the Constitution Act, 1867 with respect to parliamentary institutions. 
Not only that but there are also explicit protections for democratic rights enshrined 
in sections 3 to 5 of the Charter, sections which are not subject to the section 33(1) 
legislative override and may themselves be altered only by constitutional amendment.29
22 Ibid., at 462-63.
23 [1987] 2 S.C.R. 2.
24 Ibid., at 57.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 There is, of course, an interesting question as to whether provisions in the Constitution 
Acts which involve underlying constitutional principles are in fact subject to the process of 
constitutional amendment. In fact, at least one of the unsuccessful attacks based on underlying 
principles was on a constitutional amendment and another on an existing provision in the 
Constitution: infra note 81.
Nonetheless, section 2(b) of the Charter and its protection of the freedoms 
of “thought, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media 
of communication” is subject to the section 33(1) override. This could conceivably 
give rise to a situation in which the implied Bill of Rights is available to challenge a 
legislated notwithstanding clause which so interfered with the freedoms enshrined in 
section 2(b) as to derogate from the proper functioning of our parliamentary system. 
In such a case, the courts would be confronted with the dilemma of whether such an 
argument could prevail over the clear authority provided by section 33(1) to engage 
in the override. Would the protections implied from the structure of the Constitution 
Act, 1867 (and presumably now also sections 3 to 5 of the Charter) provide a basis for 
trumping the formal authority section 33(1) affords to Parliament and the legislatures?
That theoretical possibility aside, did the Court’s apparent recognition of 
the implied Bill of Rights come at the very moment when it had really ceased to 
be needed? In part, the answer to that question might well depend on the extent to 
which arguments based on the structure of the Canadian constitution and the promise 
of the Preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867 might extend beyond protection of 
parliamentary institutions into other domains. At this point we enter the terrain of 
recent controversy.
The controversy centres primarily on two Supreme Court of Canada 
judgments: Provincial Court Judges30 and Reference re Secession o f Quebec31 
(“Secession Reference”). In the first, the majority of the Court, over a powerful but 
solitary dissent from Justice La Forest, relied on the Preamble to the Constitution Act, 
1867 for the proposition that provincial court judges enjoy constitutionally protected 
guarantees of impartiality, independence, and of financial security, the latter being 
of particular interest in the case. In the second, the Court identified four underlying 
principles of the Canadian constitution, capable of creating constitutional rights and 
entitlements over and above those enshrined specifically in the constitution itself. Those 
underlying constitutional principles are federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and 
the rule of law in the context of protection of minorities. As is well-known, the Court 
then deployed these principles for the purposes of determining both that secession is 
constitutionally possible and the conditions under which it could take place.
The Court’s assertion of these constitutional principles attracted harsh 
criticism, including assertions that the Court had arrogated to itself the power to rewrite 
the constitution or to expand its coverage by an illegitimate gap-filling process.32 This
30 Ref re Remuneration o f Judges o f Provincial Court o f Prince Edward Island; Manitoba 
Provincial Judges Assn. v. Manitoba (Minister o f  Justice), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3.
31 [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217.
32 R. Elliot, “References, Structural Argumentation and the Organizing Principles of Canada’s 
Constitution” (2001) 80 Canadian Bar Review 67; W.H. Hurlburt, “Fairy Tales and Living 
Trees: Observations on Recent Constitutional Decisions o f the Supreme Court of Canada”
role is criticized as being too vague, uncertain and open-textured, as having no basis 
or foundation in the text of the constitution (“the imaginary principles of constitutional 
law”, to borrow a phrase from a colleague), and, in the case of the guarantees of 
independence for provincial court judges, as involving historical revisionism and 
rejection of the explicit text and structure of the constitution itself.33 More generally, 
what also concerns many of the critics is a sense of a further anti-democratic and anti- 
constitutional power grab by unelected and unaccountable courts.34
The validity of these criticisms will be the focus of the balance of this 
essay. More particularly, I want to tease out what the current debate tells us about the 
essential nature and components of our constitutional arrangements and the project 
of actually doing constitutional law. What sources should count and what modes of 
analysis, argumentation or interpretation are appropriate or valid? If we can at least 
begin to isolate in those terms what is at stake, we may be on the road to resolving the 
difficulties or at least understanding where the true causes of the controversy lie. I also 
want to suggest that the judgments and extra-curial writings of Justice Rand may help 
us see some of the problems or dilemmas.
(1999) 26 Manitoba Law Journal 181; W. J. Newman, ““Grand Entrance Hall,” Back Door 
or Foundation Stone? The Role of Constitutional Principles in Construing and Applying the 
Constitution of Canada” (2001) 14 Supreme Court Law Review (2d) 197; J. Leclair, “Canada’s 
Unfathomable Unwritten Constitutional Principles” (2002) 27 Queen’s Law Journal 389; 
J. Cameron, “The Written Word and the Constitution’s ‘Vital Unstated Assumptions’” 
in P. Thibault, B. Pelletier and L. Perret (eds.), Essays in Honour o f  Gérald-A. Beaudoin 
(Cowansville: Éditions Yvon Blais, 2002) at 89. Qualified support for the application of 
underlying principles or norms can, however, be found in D. Gibson, “Constitutional Vibes: 
Reflections on the Secession Reference and the Unwritten Constitution” supra note 17; 
P. Monahan, “The Public Policy Role of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Secession 
Reference” (1999-2000) 11 N.J.C.L. 65; M. D. Walters, “The Common Law Constitution in 
Canada: Return of Lex Non Scripta as Fundamental Law” (2001) 51 University o f Toronto 
Law Journal 92; S. Choudhry, “Unwritten Constitutionalism in Canada: Where Do Things 
Stand?” (2001) 35 Canadian Business Law Journal 113; and David Dyzenhaus, “Constituting 
the Rule o f Law: Fundamental Values in Administrative Law” (2002) 27 Queen’s L.J. 445; 
and more generally, K. Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or Democratic 
Dialogue (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001) at 139 especially.
33 S. M. Corbett, “Reading the Preamble to the British North America Act, 186T’ (1998) 9 
Constitutional Forum 42 and Walters, supra note 32, at 100-04 particularly.
34 This is, o f course, the central theme of the strongest opposition to the work of the Supreme 
Court o f Canada in the era of the Charter. F. L. Morton and R. Knopff, Charter Politics 
(Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2000), endorsed almost without qualification by R. H. 
Bork in Coercing Virtue: The Worldwide Rule o f Judges (Toronto: Vintage Canada, 2002) at 
chapter 3. See also C. Manfredi, Judicial Power and the Charter: Canada and the Paradox 
o f  Liberal Constitutionalism, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2001).
WHAT IS THE CANADIAN CONSTITUTION?
Warren Newman, in an article largely critical of the role of unwritten and underlying 
constitutional principles, at least as free-standing sources of constitutional law, defines 
the problem away when he describes the Canadian constitution as consisting of “the 
provisions of the written text” and “the conventions of the Constitution” with only 
the former giving rise to justiciable claims.35 However, there is a very real sense in 
which this definition is incomplete. This becomes clear when we consider the state of 
Canadian constitutional law prior to 1982. The claim that our constitution was entirely 
text and convention-based at that time surely encounters serious objections.
This point was made with force by the Supreme Court of Canada in New 
Brunswick Broadcasting Co. v. Nova Scotia (Speaker o f the House o f  Assemblyj36 
(“New Brunswick Broadcasting'). Justice McLachlin, for a majority of the Court, held 
that parliamentary privileges prevailed over media claims to televise the proceedings 
of the Nova Scotia House of Assembly, based on section 2(b) of the Charter. In 
upholding parliamentary privileges as constitutional norms and as capable of trumping 
express provisions of the Charter, Justice McLachlin made particular reference not 
just to the mixed origins of Canadian constitutional law but also to section 52(2) of 
the Constitution Act, 1982 which defines the Constitution of Canada as including 
but not exclusively comprised of a list of statutory enactments.37 In New Brunswick 
Broadcasting, Chief Justice Lamer concurred with the majority on different grounds 
but in Provincial Court Judges, he expressed his general agreement with the assertion 
that the Canadian constitution was not just a text-based set of rules and principles:
I agree with the general principle that the Constitution embraces unwritten 
as well as written rules, largely on the basis of s. 52(2). Indeed, given that 
ours is a Constitution that has emerged from a constitutional order whose 
fundamental rules are not authoritatively set down in a single document, 
it is of no surprise that our Constitution should retain some aspect o f this 
legacy.38
Also suggestive of the existence of constitutional norms outside the text of 
the various statutory constitutional instruments is section 26 of the Charter, with its 
explicit statement that the recognition of certain rights and freedoms in the Charter 
does not prejudice “the existence of any other rights or freedoms that exist in Canada”.
Of course, it is possible to treat recognition of the constitutional guarantee 
of parliamentary privileges as a text-based ruling, to the extent the constitutional
35 Supra note 32, at 199.
36 [1993] 1 S.C.R. 319.
37 Ibid., at 373-74.
38 Supra note 30, at 68.
right asserted stems from or is an aspect of a status or institution provided for in the 
Constitution Act, 1867, i.e., Parliament or a Legislative Assembly. It is thin but there 
nonetheless. There are other examples. As my colleague, Mark Walters has noted,39 
probably the clearest instances of judicial recognition of constitutional rights not based 
on the terms of the various Constitution Acts and the other statutory instruments referred 
to in section 52(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982, lie in much of the constitutional law 
that has grown up around treaty and customary rights of Aboriginal peoples. More 
generally, we also find this phenomenon in the acceptance, as a matter of Canadian 
constitutional law, of those principles which formed part of the unwritten common law 
of the English constitution. Sometimes we attribute to them the force of text because, 
as in the case of parliamentary privileges, they can be related to institutions which 
form part of our explicit constitutional fabric. On other occasions, the Constitution 
Act, 1867 does not help, save perhaps through the vehicle of the Preamble, as for 
example in relation to claims of executive power and privilege, and other continued 
manifestations of residual prerogative powers.40
To recognise the existence of a set of “constitutional rules” emanating not 
primarily from the text of the Constitution Acts but from common or customary law 
does not necessarily lead to recognition of their immutability, in the sense that they 
prevail over duly enacted legislative abrogations. To so hold would be to attribute to 
all such common law constitutional rules a priority over another feature of the United 
Kingdom constitution, the supremacy of Parliament. For such “common law” rules 
to survive legislative repeal, the immutability of the rules must be argued on some 
form of more fundamental or thick textual justification than would normally suffice. 
This is particularly so in situations such as New Brunswick Broadcasting, where 
the common law rule was asserted to prevail over or render entirely inapplicable an 
express constitutional guarantee.41
39 Mark D. Walters, supra note 32, at 141.
40 For example, Babcock v. Canada (Attorney General), [2002] 3 S.C.R. 3 in which the 
Court considered the validity of the executive privilege provisions of the Canada Evidence 
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5. In response to a claim that these provisions trenched upon the 
independence o f the judiciary as guaranteed by both the Preamble to and section 96 of the 
Constitution Act, 1867, the Court wrote (at para. 60) o f the “long common law tradition 
of protecting Cabinet confidences” and the fact that “superior courts operated since pre- 
Confederation without the power to compel Cabinet confidences”. Also in Krieger v. Law 
Society o f  Alberta [2002] 3 S.C.R. 372, at para. 3, Iacobucci and Major JJ. asserted that there 
“is a constitutional principle that Attorneys General of this country must act independently 
of partisan concerns when exercising their delegated sovereign authority to initiate, continue 
or terminate prosecutions.”
41 What is left over is the fascinating question whether a legislature could legislate to reduce 
or eliminate its privileges. In the judgment, the issue is decided by reference to competing 
claims o f the common law rule and the Charter (e.g., supra note 36, at 373). McLachlin J. 
also refers to such privileges as an “inherent constitutional right” possessed by the legislature. 
However, to the extent that any such privilege is a matter of provincial constitutional law, 
section 45 of the Constitution Act, 1982 would seem to allow change by an ordinary Act of
This notion of constitutional norms with varying degrees of legal force was 
not a novel concept. Indeed, it achieved explicit recognition in the Constitution Act, 
1982, including the Charter. Some provisions of the Charter are subject to legislative 
override; others are not. Section 1 provides justification for what would otherwise 
be violations of the Charter, but such justification analysis cannot be deployed with 
respect to violations of sections 3 to 5 of the Charter or of the provisions of the 
Constitution Act, 1867 or of other statutory enactments which are expressly made part 
of our constitutional framework by virtue of section 52(2). Also claiming attention is 
the Canadian Bill o f  Rights42 and other legislation such as human rights codes which 
have been described by the courts as having gwasz-constitutional status.43 The Bill o f  
Rights prevails over prior and subsequent legislation44 but, like most provisions of the 
Charter, its protections are also subject to a form of legislative override.45
In short, what counts as constitutional law in Canada comes from a wide 
variety of sources and varies greatly in the intensity of the level of guarantee provided. 
In such a regime, it is hardly surprising that appeals to underlying principles, extra- 
textual norms, and common law rules with slight textual support are frequent and 
sometimes judicially recognised.
Indeed, even in countries where the written constitution is a single document 
intended at its inception to be the exclusive source of constitutional rights and freedoms, 
there may nonetheless be room for development of other than text-based constitutional 
norms. Thus, in his monograph, Designing Democracy - What Constitutions Do?,46 
Cass Sunstein, speaking principally but not exclusively about the United States 
Constitution, expresses the following point of view:
Where do constitutional rights come from? Once a constitution is in place, 
the usual answer is: the words of the constitution. The answer is right so far 
as it goes, but it is ludicrously incomplete. The rights-conferring provisions 
of most constitutions are vague and apparently open-ended; they are hardly 
self-interpreting....
the legislature.
42 S.C. 1960, c. 44.
43 E.g., in the case of Human Rights Codes, Canada (Attorney General) v. Mossop [1993] 1 
S.C.R. 554; also, Béliveau St.-Jacques v. Fédération des employées et employés de service 
public [1996] 2 S.C.R. 345 (Quebec’s Charter o f  Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q. 
1977. c. C-12); Lavigne v. Canada (Office o f Commissioner o f  Official Languagesj, [2002] 2 
S.C.R. 773 (Privacy Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21 and the Official Languages Act, R.S.C. 1985, 
c. 31 (4th Supp.).
44 Supra note 42, sections 1 and 2.
45 Ibid., section 2 requires an express declaration that a statute operate notwithstanding the 
Canadian Bill o f Rights.
46 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).
The conventional lawyer’s tools include not just text but also constitutional
structure and history....
Sometimes, however, these conventional sources o f interpretation run out,
in the sense that they leave large gaps and ambiguities.47
He then goes on to consider how the courts should respond to situations 
where the text has “run out”,48 a matter to which I will turn towards the end of this 
essay. However, for present purposes, suffice it to say that he rejects the view that the 
courts have no role to play where the problems of gaps and ambiguities cannot be 
resolved simply by appeals to structure and history.
What also needs to be kept in mind in assessing the legitimacy of the use 
by courts of underlying constitutional principles is the extent to which terminology 
matters in the description of judgments and in setting the terms for debate. Put bluntly, 
“underlying” and “unwritten” are not synonymous in this domain, despite the fact 
that even the Supreme Court of Canada seems to treat them as such and that this essay 
has not yet really distinguished between them. In fact, it is not without significance 
that those opposed to the use of underlying principles commonly speak of them as 
being also “unwritten principles”. That to some extent gives critics an immediate and 
unjustified advantage.
Thus, if we take the four underlying principles of the Canadian constitution 
identified in the Secession Reference, one at least is actually explicitly recognized as 
an underlying principle in the constitution itself. The Preamble to the Constitution 
Act, 1982 proclaims that “Canada is founded on principles that recognize...the Rule of 
Law”. Nor are the other underlying constitutional principles (federalism, democracy 
and the protection of minorities) unwritten, given that each can be justified by clear 
references to the structure and text of the Constitution Acts, 1867-1982, including 
the Charter. What for the most part are unwritten are not the principles but the more 
particular rules derived from the principles. Once you leave aside those few aspects of 
the common law constitution, such as executive privilege and Crown immunity, that 
lack a textual base, the real issue is the extent to which the courts should be able to 
create explicit constitutional rules not found in the text.
Moreover, even in the performance of that task, text is by no means irrelevant. 
On occasion, as seen already, the relevant underlying principle notwithstanding, text 
may simply indicate that adoption of a particular rule will do unnecessary violence 
to a particular provision in the text of the constitution or to its structure. Beyond that, 
however, text also counts to the extent it provides a basis for arguing by analogy from
47 Ibid., at 69.
48 Ibid., see generally chapter 3, “Against Tradition”.
that which is there already. Thus, one strong, if not the strongest, basis for asserting 
a principle-based claim for recognition of an “unwritten” constitutional rule arises in 
situations where it can be seen as a natural offshoot from other explicit constitutional 
protections. Conversely, there will be considerable need for caution in most instances 
where the textual support for creation of the rule in question is lacking or very thin, 
albeit that the claim is principle-based. In short, by describing the Court’s project 
as that of the promotion of “unwritten principles”, critics are not only mis-speaking 
but also covering up the fact that “written” and “unwritten” are not in reality sharply 
differentiated concepts but are points on a spectrum.
In light of this analysis, I now turn to the two controversial appeals to 
unwritten or underlying constitutional principles, those emanating from the Supreme 
Court of Canada in the Provincial Court Judges case and the Secession Reference.
THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY
Many points about the Canadian constitution can be elucidated usefully from the 
evolution of the role and nature of the Canadian judiciary. For these purposes, I 
will concentrate on four critical aspects in that evolution: the role of the courts in 
adjudicating the constitutionality of legislation; the protection of the superior, district 
and county courts from provincial reduction of their jurisdiction; the protection of 
superior, district and county courts from federal trenching upon their jurisdiction; and 
the guarantees of independence and impartiality possessed by all courts.
While Canada never had the equivalent of Marbury v. Madison,49 Canadian 
courts eventually came to accept that they had the capacity to strike down legislation 
found to violate provisions of the Constitution Act, 1867. There have been useful and 
informative historical analyses of this issue in Canadian law and varying explanations 
of how the assertion or, perhaps more accurately, assumption of this role came about.50 
Indeed, it may well be that the best account is that based on the notion of the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council policing subordinate legislatures in the exercise of 
authority conferred on them by an imperial statute.51 Whatever the explanation, it is 
clear that the authority of Canadian courts to engage in this kind of constitutional
49 (1803), 5 U.S. (Cranch) 137.
50 W. R. Lederman, “The Independence of the Judiciary” (1956) 34 Can. Bar Rev. 769 and 1139; 
B. L. Strayer, The Canadian Constitution and the Courts, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 
1988); J. Smith, “The Origins of Judicial Review in Canada” (1983) 16 Canadian Journal o f 
Political Science 16; and M. D. Walters, “The Common Law Constitution”, supra note 32, at 
117-36 particularly.
51 Gordon Bale, Chief Justice William Johnstone Ritchie: Responsible Government and 
Judicial Review (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1991) at chapter 10 (“Judicial Review 
and Confederation”), writing particularly of R. v. Chandler (1869) 12 N.B.R. 556.
policing was not text-based, save in the loosest of senses; in other words, it is necessarily 
inferred from the existence of a written constitution (as in Marbury v. Madison) that 
some mechanism must exist for policing its limits and, given the inclusion in the 
Constitution Act, 1867 of a series of provisions under the heading “Judicature”, the 
section 96 courts are the most obvious candidates for this role. Whether that authority 
is derived from that form of logical gymnastics or from the role of the common law 
courts as scrutinizers of subordinate legislation, the character of the claim is more in 
the nature of a common law assertion of power than as one based on a reading of the 
text of the Constitution.
Text did play a much clearer role in the next two characteristics identified 
above. The argument in favour of guarantees for the superior, district and county courts 
against incursions by provincial legislatures was based in large measure on the assertion 
that, if the federal appointing power found in section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867 
was to continue to have meaning, these courts had to continue to have something 
to do. To allow provinces to diminish incrementally their jurisdiction would be to 
countenance the possibility that they could eventually be denuded of all jurisdiction. It 
would also diminish the role of superior courts as part of a national, unitary court system 
for the kinds of disputes that they handled. This then led to the further implication that 
they must have a guaranteed core of jurisdiction -  defined largely in terms of the 
powers being exercised by those courts at the time of Confederation -  which cannot 
be transferred directly to other provincially established courts or tribunals.52 Here, 
the connection with text is closer, in that the conclusions are derived from a specific 
provision in the Constitution Act, 1867, the federal appointing power.
Whether, of course, it is a good reading of text is another question. Thus, 
John Willis was critical of this line of jurisprudence in his seminal 1939 article in the 
Harvard Law Review,53 seeing the federal appointing power as far too thin a textual 
argument on which to base such a far-reaching inference of constitutionally-protected 
jurisdiction. For him, there was little or nothing in the pre-legislative history to indicate 
an intention to imbue the federal appointment power with such constitutional force. 
He also viewed the section 96 jurisprudence as partly enshrining an American-style 
separation of powers in the Canadian constitution, something that had certainly not 
been part of the intention of the parents of Confederation.54
Subsequently, the role of section 96 courts received a further fillip with 
application of the principles just identified to federal legislation.55 Here, the federal
52 For a good summary, see Patrick Monahan, Constitutional Law, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 
2002) at 138-44.
53 “Administrative Law and the British North America Act” (1939) 53 Harvard Law Review 
251 at 261-71.
54 Ibid, at 270-71.
appointing power would not in itself suffice. A different form of justification had to be 
provided, and this time the inferences were drawn from the protections of security of 
tenure and financial security that are found in the other provisions of the “Judicature” 
part of the Constitution Act, 1867. According to the Court, these point to the existence of 
an independent superior court judiciary, with independence defined to include not only 
the specific guarantees in sections 96-101 but also an irreducible core of jurisdiction 
based on the roles played by such courts at the time of Confederation.56 In one sense, 
this too is textual but its links with the text are certainly much more attenuated than 
those used to justify the protection of section 96 courts from provincial legislatures. In 
other words, the justifications are much more outside the formal text and structure of 
the written constitution and based increasingly on a sense of underlying values.
As Justice La Forest made only too clear in his dissent in the Provincial 
Court Judges case,57 the links with explicit text and indeed with history had arguably 
disappeared almost entirely when it came to the next extension: the recognition 
of general guarantees of impartiality and independence in the case of provincially 
appointed judges. Indeed, exclusion of such judges from the “ Judicature” provisions 
of the Constitution Act could well be read as indicating exactly the opposite conclusion 
-  that independence for such judges is entirely up to the provinces, with the only 
historical discipline being the appellate powers possessed by section 96 courts over 
judgments of provincially-appointed judges. Aside from the legitimacy of using the 
Preamble alone to justify such a constitutional protection for provincial court judges, 
the constitution of the United Kingdom, which in principle the four founding provinces 
were endorsing, was a constitution which itself did not recognise any guarantees of 
independence for inferior court judges at that time (1867). The Act o f  Settlement, 1701 
only applied to superior court judges.
The question then arises whether any of these four evolutions represents 
“bad” constitutional law. That is an extremely difficult question and is, in large 
measure, contingent on the legitimacy of demands for clear authority in the text. How 
thick do the textual justifications have to be? When do single words (“Parliament”) 
or phrases (a federal appointing power) justify the recognition of substantive 
constitutional protections? To what extent, if at all, can the Preamble count as text
55 MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. Simpson, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 725.
56 Ibid., at para. 15 (per Lamer C.J.). Technically, this part of Lamer C.J.’s judgment might be 
regarded as mere obiter dicta since the protection for provincially-appointed judges was 
founded principally on section 11(d) o f the Charter and its guarantee o f an “independent 
and impartial tribunal” for those charged with an offence, this being the core o f provincially- 
appointed judges’ workloads. However, the Court has subsequently reaffirmed the Preamble- 
based nature of the guarantee in Mackin v. New Brunswick (Minister o f Finance) [2002] 1 
S.C.R. 405.
57 Supra note 30, at 181 and, more generally, at 175-86. Subsequently, these criticisms and 
others formed part of the dissenting judgment o f Marshall J.A. in Newfoundland Association 
o f Provincial Court Judges v. Newfoundland (2000), 192 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 183 (Nfld. C.A.).
for these purposes? What role does overall structure have to play in this task? How is 
history to be treated? To what extent does a reading of the text, or even the structure 
of the Constitution, depend on accurate reference to the state of affairs prevailing at 
1867, both as an imperative and to the exclusion of other visions of the Constitution? 
From this perspective, it is informative to review how Chief Justice Lamer explained 
or justified the majority position in Provincial Court Judges, a position arguably the 
most extreme to that point as to what the courts can do in the name of constitutional 
law and interpretation.
First, Chief Justice Lamer was attuned to the contrary arguments and, in 
particular, the following:
• that the text indicated an intention to exclude general independence 
protections for provincially-appointed judges, largely on an
expressio unius exclusio alterius basis;58
• that the Preamble could not be a free-standing source of constitutional 
claims;59 and
• that such protections did not extend to inferior court judges in the 
United Kingdom in 1867.60
Chief Justice Lamer did not see these as compelling and among his responses 
were the following:
• given that section 11(d) of the Charter has extended the protection 
of independence to provincially-appointed judges exercising 
criminal jurisdiction and to the evolution in Canadian conceptions 
of judicial independence, the totality of the legislative indicators 
bespeak commitment to a more general application of principles of 
judicial independence;61
• the Preamble, while not generally supporting free-standing claims 
to constitutional rights, provides an important reference point by 
which to consider filling in gaps in the Constitution in a way that 
is consistent with a general underlying principle -  this is especially 
the case in a constitutional regime where it is clear that the text has
58 Ibid., at 64.
59 Ibid., at 69.
60 Ibid., at 106.
61 Ibid., at 65-67.
never been the sole source of constitutional law and of constitutional 
rights and entitlements;62 and
in an evolving constitution, the actual state of affairs in the United 
Kingdom in 1867 is not decisive. Rather, what count for more are 
the principles behind that state of affairs as reflected in both the 
modem jurisdiction of provincially-appointed courts and a growing 
expectation or sense of the application of principles of independence 
to these forms of adjudication.63
This latter conclusion is underscored by a situation where entitlements to 
independent adjudication depend not on the nature of the dispute but on the status 
of the court exercising jurisdiction, as exemplified by the overlapping jurisdiction 
of provincially and federally-appointed judges in the adjudication of matrimonial 
disputes.
Whether this is enough to establish the claim may be a close call but the same 
is true of many constitutional cases. To the extent that any assessment depends on the 
legitimacy of Lamer C.J.’s mode of reasoning, there are points that can be made in 
favour of the judgment. First, it is self-conscious of its transformative effect. Second, 
it attempts to locate itself within the text of the constitution and not just the Preamble. 
Third, in so far as the Preamble is a critical analytical feature, it is used to establish 
the general principle reflected in the Act o f  Settlement, 1701 model of protection for 
superior court judges. Fourth, treatment of the constitution as a necessarily evolving 
and not static set of norms is framed by the constraints of text, structure and principle. 
It does not represent in any sense an at-large claim to update the constitution by 
imposing new rules in accord with current conditions.
Within that framework, the doubts and questions that arise are more about 
whether the reading of text, structure and Preamble has paid adequate regard to 
potentially countervailing factors and, in particular, the pull of the role of provinces 
within federalism generally and as reflected by the Constitution Act, 1867’s implicit 
conferral on the provinces of the appointing power for inferior courts and tribunals.64 
Does it go too far in constraining the exercise of that power to insist that appointments 
made by the provinces carry with them a sufficient guarantee of impartiality and 
independence?
62 Ibid., at 69-70.
63 Ibid., at 76-77.
64 For these purposes, I refrain from textual comment on the actual directions that the Supreme 
Court of Canada gave the provinces as to how financial security was to be achieved for 
provincially-appointed judges. On this matter, I in fact harbour many o f the reservations 
expressed by critics of the decision.
Questions about the methodology used also arise at another level. Justice 
Rand and other judges who espoused the notion of an implied Bill of Rights had, 
as their primary objective, the enhancement or preservation of democratic values 
and parliamentary institutions. Similarly, Sunstein condemns total reliance in 
constitutional interpretation on originalism and tradition and accepts the need under 
constrained circumstances for courts to engage in gap-filling. Nonetheless, Sunstein’s 
condemnation is largely premised on the objective of enhancing “deliberative 
democracy”,65 and the question must be asked: does enhancement of the independence 
of the judiciary have similar claims on this methodology?
In fact, this inquiry calls into question not just the judgment in Provincial 
Court Judges but also the assumption by Canadian courts of the power to review 
the constitutionality of legislation and the ultimate reading of sections 96-101 as 
guaranteeing to superior courts a core of jurisdiction immune from both Parliament and 
a provincial legislature. To what extent should the general rejection of an American- 
style separation of powers, and the thin textual support for the guaranteed existence of 
an independent judiciary in the Constitution Act, 1867, constrain the courts from the 
essentially self-interested exercise of divining such a principle from the combination 
of Preamble and slight textual support? My sense is that the key to this question 
lies in the realisation that the effectuation of democratic principles is but one of the 
underlying principles of Canadian constitutional law, a point made clear subsequently 
in the Secession Reference (to which I will turn shortly). Chief Justice Lamer also 
emphasised this in linkages he made between the existence of an independent and 
impartial judiciary and the maintenance of the rule of law.
Critics of Provincial Court Judges and its methodology also put in issue the 
uncertainty produced by the judgment. How much more room does it create for judicial 
interference with provincial control over the administration of justice, as conferred by 
section 92(14) of the Constitution Act, 18671 In particular, Justice La Forest, in dissent, 
raised the question of whether this would bring within the ambit of the protection “all 
sorts of administrative tribunals, some of which are of far greater importance than 
ordinary civil courts”.66 Indeed, that is a question raised by the majority judgment. 
Moreover, subsequently in Ocean Port Hotel Ltd. v. British Columbia (Liquor Control 
and Licensing Branch, General Manager)61 (“Ocean Port”), the Court apparently 
provided a negative answer by reference to the Preamble does not mean that that 
concern or possibility was an over-reaction to the possible ramifications of Chief 
Justice Lamer’s position. Indeed, in my view, for the reasons articulated by Justice La 
Forest, there are indeed powerful bases in the logic of Chief Justice Lamer’s reasons for 
the assertion of similar protections for certain administrative tribunals. To that extent, 
all that Ocean Port teaches is that the Court possesses the capacity for constraint in
65 Supra note 46, in particular, chapter 1, “Deliberative Trouble”.
66 Supra note 30, at 185.
67 [2001] 2 S.C.R. 781.
pushing the boundaries of judicial independence further. However, even assuming the 
Court, in that case, had recognised a constitutional status for the independence of some 
administrative tribunals, it would not necessarily mean that the Court had employed or 
relied upon “bad” methodology or principles of constitutional adjudication.68
In this regard, it is worthwhile to contrast the claims for provincial court 
and even tribunal independence with two other expansive constitutional claims 
advanced in recent years. The first is the contention that, through the underlying 
principle of democracy, municipalities must now be taken to have achieved a measure 
of constitutional status in the Canadian constitutional order, a contention adjudicated 
and rejected in both Ontario69 and Quebec.70 While it may be that the time has come 
for a constitutional amendment to recognise this status, the difficulty with judicial 
recognition of even limited constitutional guarantees for municipalities is that it has 
no basis whatsoever in the text of the Constitution Acts or other statutory instruments 
comprising the Canadian constitution. Nor is it supported by any constitutional 
common law. To accept such a contention, even in the name of such a hallowed 
concept as democracy, would indeed amount to conferring a power of constitutional 
amendment on the courts.
My second example involves the challenge to federal legislation cancelling 
contracts for the expansion to Pearson International Airport without making provision 
for compensation. In an article written in support of that challenge, Patrick Monahan 
argued that the principle of no expropriation without compensation could be read into 
the Canadian constitution.71 Here again there is an absence of textual support, both 
in the Constitution Act, 1867 and in the rights and freedoms found in the Charter. 
Certainly, there is a common law rule that might be invoked in favour of the principle; 
however, that rule is only one of statutory interpretation.72 Not only that, it is a rule of 
interpretation that in its expression conceded the right of the legislature to do exactly 
the opposite: absent express legislative provision, there is a presumption that the 
legislature does not intend expropriation without compensation.73
68 I deal in greater detail with this issue in “Ocean Port Hotel and Statutory Compromises of 
Tribunal Independence” (2002) 9 Canadian Labour and Employment Law Journal 193. See 
also Bell Canada v. Canadian Telephone Employees Assn. [2003] 1 S.C.R. 884 at para. 29, 
where McLachlin C.J. (for the Court) continued to appear skeptical about such a claim.
69 East York (Borough) v. Ontario (Attorney General) (1997), 34 O.R. (3d) 789 (O.C., G.D.), 
aff’d. (1997), 36 O.R. (3d) 733 (C.A.), leave to appeal denied [1997] S.C.C.A. No. 647 
(Q.L.).
70 Baie d ’Urfé (Ville) c. Québec (Procureur Général), [2001] R.J.Q. 2520 (C.A.), leave to 
appeal denied [2001] C.S.C.R. no. 525 (Q.L.).
71 “Is the Pearson Legislation Constitutional?: The Rule of Law as a Limitation on Contract 
Repudiation by Government” (1995) 33 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 411.
72 Manitoba Fisheries v. Canada [1979] 1 S.C.R. 101.
73 Ibid., applying the classic statement of Lord Atkinson in Attorney-General v. De Keyser’s 
Royal Hotel Ltd. [1920] A.C. 508 (H.L., Eng.) at 542.
Moreover, while even Justice Rand in his extra-judicial writings and at 
points in his judgment in Roncarelli was of the view that the “exercise of ...economic 
rights”74 is part of the essential freedoms of Canadians, by which positive law and the 
exercise of executive power were to be evaluated normatively, there is no whiff of 
protection for such rights in the Constitution Act, 1867. Indeed, as far as the Charter 
is concerned, there is a clear intention, evident from both text and legislative history, 
to exclude protection for property and economic rights from section 7. The fear of 
Lochner-isation was palpable. Indeed, notwithstanding Jamie Cameron’s raising of 
this spectre in her criticism of the overuse of unwritten and underlying constitutional 
principles,75 the clarity of that fear as manifest in text and structure makes it highly 
unlikely that we will ever witness the insinuation of that specific form of political and 
economic philosophy or policy into Canada’s constitution in the name of unwritten or 
underlying principles.76
In short, I contend that these two examples demonstrate that the methodology 
deployed by the Supreme Court in Provincial Court Judges does not open the door 
to unconstrained assertion of claims based on constitutional principle divorced totally 
from text and structure. The analysis, while perhaps more expansive and expansionary 
than in previous Canadian constitutional law jurisprudence, is nonetheless conducted 
within limits. It does not amount to an at-large power to engage in constitutional 
amendment or readjustment. It now remains to be seen whether the same can be said 
of the subsequent reasons for decision in the Secession Reference.
THE SECESSION REFERENCE
As pointed out on many occasions,77 the Supreme Court of Canada’s identification 
of four underlying principles of the Canadian constitution in the Secession Reference 
was scarcely controversial, as a statement of at least some of those understandings or 
pillars on which our formal constitutional arrangements are built. It was both good 
political science and constitutional history. At least since the Constitution Act, 1982
74 “The Role of an Independent Judiciary in Preserving Freedom” (1951) 9 U.T.L.J. 1 at 5. 
Subsequently, in that paper (at 10), he also made the following assertion: “The vested 
interests in property are whimpering apologetics compared with the vested interests claimed 
in mind”.
75 Supra note 32.
76 However, I do concede that, for these purposes, the terms of section 1(a) of the Canadian 
Bill o f  Rights with its protections for property rights and the use of the term “due process”, 
did leave open the possibility of a Lochner-based argument in relation to federal legislation. 
Such an argument would, however, at least have the claim to be based on text. However, see 
Authorson v. Canada (Attorney General) [2003] 2 S.C.R. 40, rejecting both substantive and 
procedural due process attacks on legislation expropriating property rights in the form of a 
civil claim over an interest in pension money.
77 Monahan, supra note 32, at 74.
(including the Charter), federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and the Rule of Law, 
and the protection of minorities represent a nice encapsulation of the principles behind 
both our written constitutional texts and many common law constitutional rules. As 
such, they also uncontroversially provide bases upon which text can be understood, 
interpreted and applied.
What is obviously more controversial is the Court’s acceptance that, 
independent of text, the four principles can give rise to “substantive legal obligations” 
as well as place limitations on governmental action.78 After in effect assuming that the 
road to secession did not pass through any of the various amending formulae found in 
the Constitution Act, 1982, the Court not only answered in the affirmative the question 
of whether secession is legally possible but also prescribed conditions on which such 
a fracture of the overall constitutional fabric could take place. More particularly, in 
obliging the federal government and perhaps also the provinces to a duty to negotiate 
in the wake of a clear majority vote on a clear question, the Court relied extensively on 
these four underlying and unwritten principles.
Much has been written about the judgment, including such prior questions 
as: whether the issues posed in the Reference were indeed justiciable? Whether the 
answer to the question posed on the legality of secession was in fact provided by the 
amending formulae of the Constitution Act, 19821 And, whether the Court had any 
warrant going beyond the questions actually posed by the federal government on the 
Reference and simply holding that there is a right to secede, without specifying the 
conditions on which that right could be exercised?
I do not wish to revisit those questions but rather to pose another: assuming the 
Court is correct (and I am inclined to think it is) in holding that the issue of secession 
transcended the various amending formulae, how should the Court have dealt with the 
issue of the legislative gap on one of the most fundamental issues bearing upon the 
constitution of a federal country? The issue called for resolution. Declining to answer 
the question on the basis that it was purely political or non-justiciable would almost 
certainly have attracted considerable criticism of a Court which had proclaimed its 
superior competence and authority over constitutional questions.79 To have refused 
to respond to one of the most fundamental of all constitutional questions would have
78 Supra note 31, at 249.
79 The proposition is well-put by Sir Kenneth Keith of the New Zealand Court o f Appeal in 
writing about the advisory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice: “The Court, 
in these cases, is being approached as part o f a broader process which will generally and 
properly be characterized as ‘political’. There is nothing remarkable in that. Indeed, the 
very idea of giving advice to the organs of the U.N. and to the specialized agencies will 
almost always carry that implication with it.” K. J. Keith, “The Advisory Jurisdiction of 
the International Court o f Justice: Some Comparative Reflections” (1996) 17 Australian 
Yearbook o f International Law 39 at 54.
been to default on what is arguably a constitutional obligation. Moreover, having 
determined by reference to underlying principles that there could be a legal secession, 
it then begged the question of what the law required. If the process had not been 
outlined, the response of the parties to the litigation would understandably have been: 
“Okay, it can be legal but now tell us how it can happen legally”.
Basically, when the written text does not deal with a transcendent question of 
constitutional law, normal constraints on gap-filling in the absence of textual support 
become attenuated to the point of disappearance; and the Court loses credibility if 
it shirks in its duty to provide an answer to a question that is larger than the text.80 
In a sense, it is the same sort of situation that exists when courts are asked to deal 
with an apparent revolution and their written constitution says nothing about the law 
of revolutions. The courts default in their obligations by not dealing with the issues 
raised and, where feasible, they must do their best by reference where feasible to the 
underlying principles on which the text itself is constructed.
In fact, my principal purpose in making these arguments is not to advance 
the claim that the Supreme Court of Canada was correct in determining that there is a 
legal right to secede, and delineating the conditions under which secession could be 
achieved. Rather, the main point is that either way, in the face of one of the ultimate 
legal gaps on a matter which strikes at the entire fabric of the constitution, there may 
be no place to go other than unwritten or underlying principles for the determination 
of this question. Indeed, I introduce the qualifier “may” only because of the possibility, 
despite textual silence, that the pre-constitutional deliberations could in some 
instances be of utility in determining the original intention of the framers as to the 
availability of a right of secession. The Court’s willingness to appeal to unwritten or 
underlying principles in an extraordinary case such as this may tell us very little about 
judicial willingness to see these same principles as independent, free-standing bases 
for constitutional challenges, if there is no threat to the entire underpinnings of the 
country’s constitutional arrangements. The literal meaning of some of the language in 
the judgment notwithstanding, the occasions for this kind of invocation of underlying 
principles may be few indeed. Though that is not to say that they will not have a 
significant impact as instruments of constitutional argument when there is at least 
some, albeit thin, textual support for the assertions being advanced.
80 Sunstein (supra note 46, at 95-114) argued against including a right to secede in constitutions 
but then acknowledged (at 113-14) that if such a right was included it should be a justiciable 
right. That at least suggested that he considered it appropriate for a court to ask the question 
whether a constitution contains such a right. So far as I know, Justice Rand never wrote about 
the possibility of provinces seceding. However, he was of the view that the power to amend 
the British North America Act, 1867 conferred on the Parliament of Canada was sufficient to 
authorise legislation seceding from Britain in the sense of abandoning the monarchy: I. C. 
Rand, “Some Aspects of Canadian Constitutionalism” (1960) 38 Can. Bar Rev. 135 at 150.
Indeed to this point, while there have been numerous attempts to use the 
unwritten or underlying constitutional principles identified in the Secession Reference 
as a springboard to challenge legislation and executive actions of various kinds, the 
successes have been few.81 In Ontario, there has been one prominent and controversial 
application of the fourth principle: the protection of minorities. In Lalonde v. 
Commission de restructuration des services de santé, 82 both the Divisional Court 
and the Court of Appeal upheld a challenge to an order of the Commission that the 
Montfort Hospital in Ottawa be reorganized and downsized significantly as part of the 
Commission’s overall mandate for restructuring the health care system in the province.
Among arguments made by those seeking judicial review of this decision 
was that the Commission’s order was unconstitutional, to the extent that it failed to 
take account of the unique status of the hospital as a francophone health care facility 
serving the Ottawa region. The respondent objected to this use of the underlying 
principle of respect for minorities, arguing that to do so would violate the constitutional 
text by adding to the language rights found in the Constitution Act, 1867 and the 
Charter. However, the courts rejected this text-based expressio unius, exclusio alterius 
argument. This was not a case simply about language rights. It was more broadly- 
based than that. It was also about respect for and protection of francophone minority 
communities in Ontario. The fact that the applicants could not make their claim by 
reference to specific provisions in the Constitution on linguistic rights did not pre­
empt reliance by the applicants on the broader concept of community implicit in the 
principle of respect for minorities.
81 Among the failures were attempts referred to above (supra notes 69-70 and accompanying 
text) to use the principle o f democracy to secure a constitutional basis for the protection 
of municipalities. See also Hogan v. Newfoundland (Attorney General) (2000) 183 D.L.R. 
(4th) 225 (Nfld. C.A.) challenging, on the basis o f the rule of law, protection of minorities, 
and the duty to negotiate, a constitutional modification to the Terms of Union between 
Newfoundland and Canada with respect to guarantees for denominational schools; Brown 
v. Alberta (1999) 177 D.L.R. (4th) 349 (Alta. C.A.) relying on democracy to attack the 
appointment of senators by the Governor in Council as provided for in the Constitution Act, 
1867\ Bacon v. Saskatchewan Crop Insurance Corporation (1999) 180 Sask. R. 20 (C.A.), 
involving a provision retroactively removing a right of action, legislation that allegedly 
infringed the principle of the rule of law; and Singh v. Canada (Attorney General) (sub 
nom. Westergard-Thorpe) v. Canada [2000] 3 F.C. 185 (C.A.), involving a challenge to the 
executive privilege provisions of the Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. C-5, on the basis 
that they infringed the independence o f the judiciary and the rule o f law, all o f which are 
discussed by Newman, supra note 32, at 220-23 and LeClair, supra note 32, seriatim. While 
the Court denied leave to appeal in Singh, subsequently in Babcock v. Canada (Attorney 
General), supra note 40, the Court upheld the relevant provisions rejecting attacks based on 
the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary, and the separation o f powers, and the core 
jurisdiction o f the courts. In relation to the first three of these arguments, McLachlin C.J. 
(at para. 55) emphasised the need to balance any claims based on “unwritten constitutional 
principles... against the principle of parliamentary sovereignty”.
82 (1999) 181 D.L.R. (4th) 263 (Ont. Div. Ct.), aff’d (2001) 208 D.L.R. (4th) 577 (Ont. C.A.).
What was also significant about the use by the Court of the underlying principle 
in Lalonde was that it did not lead to the striking down of legislation. Indeed, the Court 
of Appeal made abundantly clear that it was not ruling on whether a legislated closing 
of the hospital would be unconstitutional.83 Rather, the Court deployed the principle 
in aid of the interpretation of two statutes, the French Language Services Act84 and the 
legislation establishing the Health Services Re-structuring Commission.85 Moreover, 
the outcome was a quashing of the Commission’s ruling and remission of the matter 
to the Minister for reconsideration, in accordance with principles identified in the 
judgment and, in particular, the way in which the Commission’s discretion should have 
been exercised consistent with an interpretation of the French Language Services Act, 
which took account of the underlying principle of protection of minority rights. This 
was far removed from sterilisation (let alone striking down) of the express terms of 
otherwise valid provincial legislation. Indeed, from the perspective of the principles 
of judicial review of administrative action, as the Court itself pointed out,86 it was no 
more nor less than what the courts had done on prior occasions (including famously 
Rand in Roncarelli): measuring the exercise of executive discretion by reference 
to underlying values, with the normal methodology of abuse of discretion review 
changing to the extent that, where constitutional values are at stake, less deference is 
paid to the judgment of the responsible executive agent. The standard of review tends 
to be that of correctness, rather than patent unreasonableness or irrationality.
Viewed from this perspective, it is difficult to find any reason to quarrel with 
the approach of the Ontario Courts. The text of the Constitution itself provided clear 
support for the aspiration of protecting French language, culture and identity.87 The 
extent of the emphasis on those objectives in the text, as well as the background to 
the pacts which produced both the Constitution Acts of 1867 and 1982 (and indeed 
some of the Constitution Acts in between), certainly justified the characterisation 
of protection of minority groups as an underlying principle of the Constitution. To 
confine executive discretion, exercised under an ordinary statute and by reference to 
the terms of another ordinary statute which bespeaks a similar purpose of protection of 
minorities, is not just permissible but long-accepted as the only proper way to analyse 
the exercise of delegated executive power that undercuts constitutional principles. 
Under this rubric, clearly established constitutional principles should always trump 
the seemingly open-ended nature of delegated discretionary powers, at least absent 
explicit legislative indicators to the contrary.
83 Ibid., 208 D.L.R. (4th) at 629 and 181 D.L.R. (4th) at 283.
84 R.S.O. 1990, c. F.32.
85 Ministry o f  Health Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.26 (as amended by Savings and Restructuring Act, 
S.O. 1996 c. 1, Schedule 5).
86 Supra note 83,208 D.L.R. (4th) at 641-46.
87 For example, section 133 o f the Constitution Act, 1867 and sections 16-23 of the Charter.
What did become difficult is the extent to which this reasoning would have 
been permissible had the hospital been closed by legislative fiat, or if the Minister or 
the Commission had been given express power to act notwithstanding the language and 
objectives of the French Language Services Act. Absent some form of direct textual 
support, in the sense of a constitutional provision which, as a matter of interpretation, 
could carry the case against the legislative provision, could courts justify intervention 
by appealing to the underlying principle of protection of minorities? In the age of the 
Charter, is there room for a new and potentially more extensive implied Bill of Rights 
by which courts can add to express provisions that guarantee rights and freedoms in 
this country?
As a matter of positive law, this question stands unanswered. From a normative 
perspective, my hunch is that the field of fundamental human rights and freedoms 
(such as the protection of minorities) has been largely occupied; and the opportunities 
and justifications for judicial supplementation by appeals to underlying constitutional 
values will be few indeed. The same may not be so in the case of other underlying 
constitutional principles, particularly where the potential field of application is diffuse 
and not nearly so obviously dealt with in a seemingly comprehensive or code format in 
a constitutional text. Here, I think particularly of the Rule of Law. On this, there may 
well be more room and legitimacy for making such arguments.88
As long as it is conceded that the Canadian constitution is not found 
exclusively in an explicit constitutional text, there is reason for caution in condemning 
outright the capacity of underlying principles to produce legitimate and free-standing 
challenges to the constitutionality of legislative action. As Chief Justice Lamer made 
clear in Provincial Court Judges, “there are many important reasons for the preference 
for a written constitution over an unwritten one”.89 However, even in post-1982 
Canada, it is difficult to maintain that the combination of all the explicit constitutional 
texts represents, or was ever intended to represent, an exhaustive statement of the 
constitutional law of Canada. Where that combination of texts leaves gaps, and where 
there is no good reason for an assumption that the omission has been deliberate, our 
courts do well not to foreclose the possibility of a principled filling of any such gap, 
even if it means calling into question primary legislation.
An important footnote to this discussion is that further dimensions to this 
whole debate will almost certainly grow in significance over coming years. Among 
those dimensions are changing conceptions of the nature of parliamentary sovereignty
88 For a more restricted view of the role of this underlying principle, see P. W. Hogg and C. F. 
Zwibel, “The Rule o f Law in the Supreme Court of Canada” (2005), 55 U.T.LJ. 715, a paper 
delivered at a conference in honour of John Willis: “Administrative Law Today: Culture, 
Ideal Institutions, Process as Values”, held at the University of Toronto Faculty o f Law, 18-19 
September 2004.
89 Supra note 30, at 68 (and reiterated in the Secession Reference: supra note 31, at 249).
or, stated more broadly, the nature of sovereignty within the nation state.90 Much 
though not all of this theoretical re-conceptualisation may be the product of increasing 
globalisation, the breaking down for so many purposes of traditional national 
jurisdictional boundaries and, perhaps most importantly in legal culture to this point, 
the growing weight of international or global norms particularly in the domain of 
human rights.91 Within countries with which we share some heritage, there has also 
been much interest in a re-evaluation of the commitment to that particular species of 
sovereignty that many attribute to the work of A. V. Dicey, rather than any accurate or 
appropriate account of the evolution of the legal incidents of sovereignty in the United 
Kingdom and ultimately in its liberated colonies. One by-product of this re-evaluation 
has been a re-emergence of arguments for recognition of a species of sovereignty 
constrained by fundamental or transcendental norms, the source and content of which 
have obviously spawned much debate. When the possibilities evident in this debate 
are coupled with the theoretical differences over the very nature of constitutional law 
in Canada, as highlighted by reactions to the recent case law discussed in this essay, 
manifested earlier in debates about claims for an implied Bill of Rights, the world of 
constitutional law and theory remains very much fluid and ongoing.
LETTING JUSTICE RAND HAVE THE LAST WORD
What might Justice Rand have made of all this? In his implied Bill of Rights judgments, 
he was cautious, at least to the extent of not pushing the theory beyond what was 
needed to decide the particular case. Though admitting it was an intriguing question, 
he never ruled on whether the implied Bill of Rights could act as a fetter on the federal 
Parliament.
He did see and worry about the broader possibilities for such a theory, not 
only in his leaving the federal question acknowledged but unanswered, but also in his 
extra-judicial writing. At the University of Toronto in 1951, he posed a question which 
went beyond the implied Bill of Rights and raised fundamental questions about the 
I nature of sovereignty and the role of the courts in policing fundamental challenges to 
the established order:
90 This re-conceptualisation o f the predominance o f the principle o f parliamentary sovereignty 
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His most recent and fullest work in this area is Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory o f  
the Rule o f  Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). See also the review article o f this 
monograph by M. D. Walters, “Common Law, Reason and Sovereign Will” (2003) 53 U.T. 
L.J. 65.
91 Thus, for example, Walters, supra note 32, at 140-41 sees underlying principles as having 
their most significant role to play in the protection o f human rights, though he would not 
necessarily justify that argument on the basis of the emergence of generally accepted 
international law norms. See also A. Brudner, “The Domestic Enforcement o f International 
Conventions on Human Rights: A Theoretical Framework” (1985) 35 U.T.L.J. 219.
Let me take it further. The Parliament o f Great Britain, consisting of king, 
lords, and commons, is accepted as being endowed with the sovereign 
power o f the kingdom. Let us suppose that, observing constitutional 
procedure, Parliament should solemnly purport by statute to abolish the 
House o f Commons, or to set up a permanent dictatorship of the nature of 
that o f Russia in displacement of the present structure; would either be a 
constitutional act?92
His apparent answer to that question came many lines later:
As I have already observed, the common law acknowledges no limitations 
to legal sovereignty nor any outside juridical order which can impinge upon 
it. In a practical sense, it does not contemplate action by the legislature 
which is nugatory by reason of its contradiction o f the natural environment.
But, however independent courts may be, they are bound by the declared 
law; and the accountability o f the legislature is to the electorate.93
This seemed to answer the question that he left unanswered in Switzman. 
However, can we be sure? The question posed and answered was not within the 
Canadian constitutional context but by reference to the common law of the United 
Kingdom. Moreover, Saumur, Switzman and Roncarelli were still in the future. 
Perhaps those experiences led him to a different conception of the nature of Canadian 
sovereignty and the role of the courts, in the articulation and enforcement of the 
unwritten as well as the written constitution.
Similar uncertainties arise as to his position on the scope of the implied Bill 
of Rights. As expressed in the two key judgments, the content seemingly was confined 
to the use of implied principles effecting freedoms that contributed to the health and 
functioning of parliamentary institutions and democracy in general. This was a not 
uncommon position for advocates of limited judicial articulation of unwritten or 
underlying constitutional norms. Any court authority was thus confined to preservation 
of essential elements of democratic institutions and to conditions that contributed to its 
flourishing. Thus, for example, Cass Sunstein in Designing Democracy theoretically 
worried about an activist judiciary filling constitutional gaps and using thin text as 
a basis for broad constitutional claims. At the same time, he put aside those worries 
when the project was one of protecting “deliberative democracy”.94
92 Supra note 74, at 3.
93 Ibid., at 5.
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In Saumur, Justice Rand also emphasized the foundational nature of freedom 
of religion.95 Similarly, in his 1951 address at the University of Toronto, he brought 
within his conception of bedrock freedoms those of “belief, speech, worship, of the 
person, and of the exercise of political and [as noted earlier] economic rights”.96 
Therefore, once again an open question remained whether Justice Rand might have 
been willing, had the occasion demanded it, to expand his conception of the implied 
Bill of Rights to protection of other foundational freedoms. Indeed, he might not have 
been out of sympathy with the Court’s list of unwritten or underlying principles of the 
constitution, not only for the interpretation of text but as a basis for independent or 
free-standing constitutional claims.
Of all the matters discussed in this essay, the one domain where Justice Rand 
seemed to have little sympathy for assertions of a constitutionally protected status was 
that of an independent judiciary. While obviously a strong supporter of the concept, 
the focus of his 1951 address (entitled “The Role of an Independent Judiciary in 
Protecting Freedom”) was on integrity brought to the bench by sound appointments 
and assured by fidelity to law and the setting of appropriate administrative barriers to 
baleful influences, with nary a whiff of the existence of re-enforcing constitutional 
protections.97
Much of the criticism of Provincial Court Judges and Reference re Secession 
o f Quebec has stemmed from a concern that they will lead to uncertainty and 
indeterminacy in the existence and scope of constitutional norms. The assumption 
is that general adherence to, or exclusive focus on, text both assures greater certainty 
and indeed a satisfactory theory of constitutional law in itself. Once again in his 1951 
address, Justice Rand spoke of the extent to which “we seem to crave for rational 
theoretical completeness and legitimacy to support action”.98
It is an open question whether that craving can ever be satisfied in general 
or by a reduction of the realm of inquiry in constitutional law to exclusively text- 
based arguments. Indeed, while not meaning in any way to diminish the value in most 
situations of relative certainty in constitutional law, I conclude by again referencing 
Cass Sunstein. So varied are the competing visions of what is the appropriate theory 
of constitutional law and interpretation, and so deeply divided are the advocates of the 
various competing theories, that there may ultimately be dangers to the constitutional 
order in recognising the predominance of one theory over another. Not only will such 
a choice have the potential to polarise even further, and lessen overall respect for 
the judiciary and the constitution, but also it will ultimately lay bare the illusion that
95 Supra note 1, at 329-30.
96 Supra note 74, at 5.
97 Ibid., at 13-14.
98 Ibid., at 3.
certainty cannot be found in absolute adherence to one conception or interpretive view 
over another."
Thus, for Sunstein, an essential ingredient in good constitutional law is the 
achievement of “incompletely theorized agreements”100 about constitutional norms, 
along with reliance on “soft originalism... analogical reasoning, a general posture of 
humility, and concern for a goal of ensuring a well-functioning system of deliberative 
democracy”.101 I suggest that Justice Rand might find much in that statement with 
which to sympathize.
99 Supra note 46, at 49-51.
100 Sunstein’s discussion of this concept, ibid., at 56-66.
101 Ibid., at 90.
